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ABSTRACT: Thanks to ART.17.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council now has to “take 
into account” the results of EP Elections when selecting a candidate for the role of Commission 
President. The European Parliament has grabbed the opportunity to launch the first electoral 
race for spitzenkandidaten to the Presidency. Is this the start of a new democratizing (and thus, 
politicizing) process for the European Union? This dissertation will try to give a possible 
answer to the dilemma by constructing a comprehensive framework around EP Elections 2014 
that will involve both the Commission and the Parliament and an analysis of the debate beyond 
legal provisions and the possibility of a politicized presidency of the Commission. 
 
RESUM: Gràcies al ART. 17.7 del Tractat de Lisboa, a partir d’ara el Consell Europeu ha de 
“tenir en compte” els resultats de les Eleccions Europees al Parlament Europeu a l’hora 
d’escollir un candidat per al rol de President de la Comissió Europea. El Parlament Europeu ha 
aprofitat aquesta  oportunitat per llançar la primera campanya electoral dels “spitzenkandidaten” 
per la Presidència. Serà això el començament d´un nou procés democratitzador (i també 
polititzar) per part de la Unió Europea? Aquest treball de recerca intentarà trobar una resposta 
concreta per aquest dilema, gràcies a la construcció d’un marc comprensiu sobre les eleccions 
europees 2014. Aquest nou enfocament involucrarà tant el rol de la Comissió, com el del 
Parlament. Una anàlisi del debat més enllà dels termes legals del Tractat i la nova possibilitat 
d’una presidència polititzada de la Comissió.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On the 22
nd
-25
th
 of May 2014, European citizens were called for the eighth time to 
pronounce themselves over the election of the next European Parliament (EP). Despite 
repeated attempts to focus voters’ attention towards the only legitimized institution in 
the European Union’s (EU) architecture, different factors have always constrained the 
success of elections. On one side, the history of low turnouts (due to scarce popular 
interest) and the stealing of attention by the national Member States’ (MS) political 
arenas have often been acknowledged as classical weaknesses in the European electoral 
process. But on the other, a general lack of information about the real tasks of the EP 
and the widespread feeling that the institution does not really have an impact over EU’s 
decision (despite the recent increase in legislative powers) have also helped to shape an 
uncomfortable framework for the Union’s Parliament (See Section 2.2). However, there 
seems to be a certain level of truth in the words of EP representative Jaume Duch when 
claiming that “these (...) European elections are more political than all previous ones” 
(Riestra, 2014). At least two reasons would help to prove his point. In the first case, it is 
true that for the first time since the start of the European integration project people have 
become much more aware of the presence of a European Union (and its economic and 
monetary union) whose structural imperfections can magnify the effects of a financial 
crisis, thus imposing formulas of austerity over their daily lives (Piedrafita and Renman, 
2014, 4). In addition to that, the second element to add salience to the European 
electoral process is represented by the new rules of the game introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty and now about to be implemented for the first time: the election of the President 
of the European Commission (EC) in relation to the results of the European elections.  
 
There is much to be said about this ground-breaking, yet controversial feature of the EU 
legitimating process. As a matter of fact, the initiative could well set in motion a process 
of politicization for the EC and ultimately for European politics that may end up 
changing the whole institutional game inside the Union. Furthermore, the real news lay 
upon the idea that, for the first time in the history of Europe, it will be up to its citizens 
to have some sense of control over the selection of the face and the political color 
representing the oldest institution in the EU architecture. However, while the idea may 
seem at first glance like a panacea for the so-called EU democratic deficit, the discourse 
around the realities of the argument is much more complex and deserves a thorough 
exploration of the subject. This may well be true as much in terms of the academic 
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debate around the politicization of the Presidency of the EC as in the context of the 
recent results of the EP elections 2014. The implications (as well as the real benefits and 
hindrances) of a politicized presidency, just like the complicated framework of 
negotiations between the EP and the European Council being carried on at the time of 
writing make for a solid argument of debate. In a time in which no concrete EPs 
majority has been achieved during elections and Eurosceptic national leaders try to give 
a different intergovernmental interpretation of the Lisbon reform, it is exactly the task of 
this dissertation to attempt to shed some light over the effectiveness of the new 
institutional feature. In such a way, this piece of research will elaborate an answer to the 
following research question: Is the new 2014 "politicized" Presidency of the 
Commission going to be a real step forward in the EU legitimization process?  
 
In order to answer the question, this document will provide a comprehensive framework 
to develop the subject of the research. The methodology will involve a thorough 
documentary research of academic, media and institutional sources. This will in turn 
allow the construction of a solid puzzle of evidence necessary to gather suitable 
conclusions. Therefore, considering the multiple implications derived from the EP 
Elections 2014 and the election of the President of the EC, section 2 of this research will 
focus on specialized literature around three separate topics: the debate on the 
democratization of the EU (Section 2.1); the structural problems hidden behind EPs 
work and European elections in general (Section 2.2); finally, some necessary 
comments around the current role of the EC and the President of the Commission 
(Section 2.3). Once constructed the framework for understanding the subject, Section 3 
will enter to the heart of the argument regarding the election of the President of the 
Commission. In Section 3.1, ART. 17.7 TEU and official declarations will be analyzed 
in order to unveil the ambiguities behind the initiative; Section 3.2 will instead give 
voice to the academic debate on the politicization of the EC presidency to gather the 
elements necessary to determine the outcome of the analysis. Section 4 will be the field 
of practical analysis outside the theoretical debate and will focus on the 
“Spitzenkandidaten”1 characters and their political weaknesses (Section 4.1) and the 
                                                          
1
 The term refers to the German’s reference to the “first candidates” proposed by EPs running for the 
place of EC President. The media have indeed exploited the definition as to officially indicate this new 
typology of candidates.  
10 
 
current intergovernmental negotiations vis-à-vis the EP that may bring to a final 
outsider candidate solution; one with harsh consequences for the whole Parliament’s 
proposal (Section 4.2). Finally, our conclusions will sum up the argument and give us a 
necessary reply to the research question: the 2014 attempted politicization of the 
presidency of the Commission is not a fully successful process due to structural 
limitations imposed over the role of the President and conditioned by the current 
intergovernmental trend running in the EU. However, while the general answer may 
appear pessimistic in relation to the present situation, the author of this dissertation will 
also hint towards a hopeful approach on the future evolution of this initiative in future 
EU politics, following a trend of slow adaptation to new institutional features much 
common to the Union’s modus vivendi.   
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2. Building the Framework 
 
2.1 The democratization of the EU 
 
The academic debate around the idea of a more politicized and thus democratic Union 
can count on a solid background of specialized literature. Following Řiháčková’s 
conceptual line, it is well possible to resume the positioning of different schools of 
thought according to the following pattern: (a) democratization of the EU as not 
possible and not desirable (as in the works of Gabel and Schaffer); (b) impossible but 
desirable (Bartolini, Ferrera); (c) Possible yet not desirable (Majone, Moravcsick); (d) 
finally, both possible and desirable (Hix, Høyland) (Řiháčková, 2006, 5-6). In the words 
of Bartolini, politicization should only be placed in the EP, but it should not be affecting 
the Commission or the Council of the Union because political majorities would not last 
beyond the periodical changes of regime of the respective national MS. Furthermore, he 
generally rejects majoritarianism in the idea that it would not bring about legitimacy and 
act in the real interest of the whole 500 million citizens of the Union. (Bartolini, 2006 in 
Řiháčková, 2006, 5-6). Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsick tend to bring 
the debate even further through two very distinct approaches to the functionality of the 
EU. Majone, in his idea of the Union as a sui-generis “regulator state” in those 
competencies entrusted to it, believes that a more politicized attitude would rather 
weaken the integration project rather than reinforcing it. In a similar way as Bartolini’s 
theory, politicization of the whole EU system would only provoke inefficient 
distributive effects among MS that would ultimately hurt the true legitimacy of the 
institution. Politicization should thus stay inside the EP, while the European democratic 
deficit should be dismissed as a concept altogether when faced to the real problem: a 
deep crisis of credibility of the EU (Majone 1993, 1998, 2002, 2006 in Hix and 
Høyland, 2012, 134-135 and Řiháčková, 2006, 7-8). Yet a different argument comes 
from Moravcsick, who believes instead in the presence of a democratic deficit but also 
in the different improvements being carried over the last few years to heal it. However, 
his vision of the EU is one constantly surrounded by mediation processes with no 
politicized extremes and tends in general to adjust to EU theories of intergovernmental 
politics. Ultimately, legitimization to European outputs derives from the compliance of 
governments in their approval (Moravcsick 2002, 2008 and Crombez, 2003 in Hix and 
Høyland, 2012, 134-135). Of a completely different opinion are those belonging to the 
pro-politicization theory of the EU, as in the case of Hix and Høyland. To them, the 
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increasing raise of importance of the EU in the life of Europeans is more than enough a 
reason to promote the democratization and politicization of the institution. Thus, a more 
open and involving political debate would bring about an important number of 
consequences such as: (a). a democratic competition that would ensure the preference of 
the citizens; (b). the achievement of difficult reforms thanks to the development of 
political alliances; (c). an incentive for a renewed media attention towards the new 
“colored” EU politics; (d). the creation of a democratic yet political mandate 
responsible to their citizens and promoter of new European political identities (Hix and 
Høyland, 2012, 136-139 and Hix, 2006 in Řiháčková, 2006, 7).  
 
Despite the various positions, however, more recent studies have returned on the subject 
with a renewed emphasis on the need for democratization. Some have pointed out a 
certain EU’s “unmistakable trending towards intergovernmentalism”, at least since the 
eastern enlargement of the Union (Decker, 2012, 72) and very much likely reinforced 
by the developments of the recent Eurocrisis. Even more accurately, Weiler has tried to 
determine the two main arguments representing strong structural weaknesses in 
European governance that can be at heart of a democratization debate: the lack of a 
principle of accountability, enclosed in the idea that nowhere in the EU system it is 
possible to “throw the scoundrels out” of a political charge; and the weak principle of 
representation demonstrated by an EP incapable to transfer their political color at the 
legislative and administrative level of the Union (Weiler, 2013, 748-749). And it is 
exactly on this second point that the election of the Presidency of the EC will come into 
the debate.  
 
 
2.2 European Parties and European Elections  
 
If opposites tend to protagonize the debate around democratization, the same cannot be 
said about the literature dedicated to EPs and European elections. Here, instead, the 
results of the analysis of over 35 years and 8 mandates of EP constituencies all tend to 
deal with a well defined set of issues and structural weaknesses; one that prevents full 
recognition of the only legitimate institution of the EU system. However, such list can 
be defined alongside two main lines of thought: on one side, there is some blame in 
there to be attributed to the constant political “irrelevance” of EPs; on the other, there is 
a general recognition that European elections are often absorbed by the national political 
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arenas that tend to convert them into “second-order national elections”. As a general 
rule, academics tend to recognize some kind of added value of EPs in the European 
scene (Gagatek, 2011, 203), but they are quite critical of most of their features.  French 
author Jean-Victoir Louis borrows the definition that EPs are not political parties en 
rien according to traditional views (Priestley, 2010 in Louis, 2013, 8). Gagatek would 
also acknowledge that they are “very insignificant, to say the least” (Gagatek, 2011, 
203); even the most optimistic pro-democratization voices would tend to admit that, 
despite their evolution from simple political groups in the seventies to their Europarties 
status nowadays, they are quite limited in their political influence and sub-developed in 
relation to their national counterparts (Hix and Høyland, 2012, 144). The main 
accusations are often directed to the “useless” euro-manifestos the EPs tend to produce 
in a very ideologically vague tone, and the lack in the Parliament scene of traditional 
government vs. opposition dynamics that characterize the raison d’être of parties 
(Gagatek, 2011, 204). Despite so, it is also true that the distribution of EPs along a 
political spectrum is relatively harder to obtain than traditional national alignments. Not 
only do the parties need to deal with endless variations of “shades of national grays” 
(hence the need to define broad political lines), but the second issue to take into account 
in the European parliamentary scene is also the one associated with pro vs. against 
feelings towards European integration (Hix and Høyland, 2012, 139-140). Be it as it 
may, we may be well witnessing some sort of change in the turn of recent events. A first 
reglament on new EPs directives was approved in 2007, dealing with a better definition 
of their legal entities status, financing rules and conditions of existence (Louis, 2013, 
10-12). A further reform to better define such rules and strengthen the EPs’s profile is 
also meant to enter in force by 2017 (Gutiérrez-Rubí, 2014). When coupled to the recent 
Lisbon Treaty reinforcing role over the EP and the ambitious move of declaring the 
opening of an electoral race for the presidency of the EC, there may be proof enough to 
justify a coming shift in the significance of the EP role. Unfortunately, what remains to 
be seen is whether national counterparts will ultimately agree with such expectations. 
After all, the idea of European elections as being considered “second-order national 
elections” is one with a certain history (it dates back to Reif and Schmitt, 1980) but with 
solid proofs of existence nonetheless (Peglis, 2011, 221-222). The concept, generally 
referring to the scarce interest in the European component of the elections and the 
interpretation of the electoral race in the arena of national politics, derives from a 
twofold perspective. Europeanist tendencies would tend to point out that national parties 
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simply do not want European ideologies in their way, and that they prefer to keep them 
at safety distance in Brussels (Gagatek; 2011, 204). More critical voices, however, 
would place the blame upon the EP in failing to be an instrument of democracy for its 
citizens. By being constantly labeled as “irrelevant” in the EU decision-making process, 
incapable of influencing effectively the nomination of top positions in the EU 
architecture and without any policy entrepreneur to successfully introduce European 
topics in EP elections, the Parliament has not delivered a credible view of the European 
issues and left full protagonism to national leaders (Stratulat and Emmanouidilis, 2013, 
2). What is even worse is that the situation often generates degrees of confusion into 
voters’ minds, especially when national concerns and preferences are advertised into a 
European context. As precisely described by journalist Fernández Albertos, voters end 
up thinking in a particular way about one kind of elections while they were actually 
voting for another (Fernández Albertos, 2013). The whole situation generates therefore 
a real distortion effect on what may have been the real preferences of citizens at EU 
level. The debate is also hugely relevant to the outcome of the 2014 EP Elections, as we 
will see further down the line of research. 
 
 
2.3 Commission and Commission Presidency  
 
In order to conclude this section and construct a comprehensive framework of 
understanding of the subject, some necessary comments need to be made about the 
present condition of the EC and its Presidency in the modern EU system. As a matter of 
fact, there seems to be an important shift in the role of what once used to be an 
“administrative elite for the making of Europe”. Due to the recent Union enlargement, 
administrative reforms and a general shift of leadership in the Union towards the MS, 
the Commission seems to have now acquired a kind of “managerial role of new public 
management”. While this does not imply a reduction of its duties, it could certainly 
represent a challenge to its authority inside the EU structure (Kassim et al., 2013, 131-
133, 144-146). A similar restricting view is often applied to recent analysis of the figure 
of the President of Commission. Even if some literature still claims the Presidency to 
have an important political and administrative function inside the EC (and over the 
interests of the Union in general) (Negrescu, 2012, 69-70), others have expressed more 
critical views. Kassim et al. acknowledge the President as a figure strongly embedded 
inside its own college of commissioners. He/she is still a primus inter pares with only 
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one vote over decisions and little and less control over the College’s sub-committees, 
the secretariat-general, the general agenda-setting and even the production of minutes of 
meetings (Kassim et al., 2013, 153-156). Tömmel has analyzed the contradictions 
hidden behind the role of the Presidency, and understood the institutional charge as a 
“though job” when having to act as an effective policy-manager in the general interest 
of member states but also as a forceful policy entrepreneur of the top EU institution 
promoting integration. (Tömmel, 2013, 789-790). However, other scholars such as 
Ortega Gómez have tried to balance real powers and constrains of the President of the 
Commission by focusing on the legal instructions provided by the internal regulation of 
the EC and the provisions from the last treaties (Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon). The 
resulting interpretation of her analysis is beneficial to the Presidency, in-so-far as the 
President himself can de facto exhort the Commission to respect his own political 
orientation and his agenda-setting. Nonetheless, Ortega Gómez is also warning about 
the difference between the political orientations of the Commission and those of the 
Union in general, as she underlines that the President has no major power for steering 
the political direction of the whole EU. Despite claimings of the EC to be almost similar 
to an executive government, there is no such thing as an over-powerful and politically 
accountable President of the European Union. Instead, the system is dense with the 
presence of four presidents (EP, Commission, European Council and Eurogroup) plus 
one high representant of foreign affairs. (Ortega Gómez, 2012, 45-48, 102-103). In this 
sense, the interpretation of Negrescu of the EC Presidency as the main negotiator of the 
Union looks like an attempt to rescue the strategic position of the President in the EU 
structure. According to his own definition, his/her responsibilities would go beyond the 
resolution of conflicts inside the Commission. They would also extend to the functions 
of mediator among MS in order to influence them towards new European policies, as 
well as diplomatic functions for the EU in the international scene (Negrescu, 2012, 69-
70). But as it could be expected, when considering the extensive number of institutional 
representatives listed above, such interpretation may be considered too optimistic and 
overlapping with their own fields of action. In the end, the whole discussion may well 
open some doubts about the effectiveness of the politicization debate launched by the 
2014 electoral race. Further discussion over the topic will be conducted in Section 3.  
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3. The Election of the President of the Commission 
 
3.1 The Lisbon Treaty and the EP Electoral Race: an analysis 
 
An analysis of the legal terms justifying the innovative proposal will help to unveil a set 
of ambiguities that may explain the difficult negotiations taking place at the time of 
writing for the selection of the next EC President. In the beginning, it all started with the 
Lisbon Treaty modifications to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which in the new 
version of Art. 17.7 specify that:  
 
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having 
held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of 
the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by 
a majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the required 
majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one 
month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament 
following the same procedure. (TEU, 17.7, italics added) 
 
It appears quite clear that the article does need some degree of analysis, in-so-far as it 
does not automatically grant the European Parliament a right to elect the President of 
the EC. In its general principle, ART. 17.7 still reflects the old ART.214.2 TEU which 
already created a delicate mechanism between the European Council and the EP. Inside 
these provisions, the former would still be entrusted with the official selection of the 
candidate but the latter would be in turn granted the power to elect him/her through the 
achievement of an absolute majority in voting (at least 376 votes out of 751). However, 
in the light of the new article, Gagatek is ready to claim that by underlining the 
importance of the sentences “Taking into account the elections” and most of all “after 
having held appropriate consultations” (which, despite the free interpretation that one 
may give of the actors involved, he clearly sees as involving both the council and the 
EP), we are witnessing the creation of a system of “joint responsibility” of the two 
institutions in the election procedure (Gagatek, 2011, 209). Others, however, are not so 
optimistic. Decker and Sonnicksen do not think that the rules of the game have 
fundamentally changed towards a more democratic process. They claim the treaty to be 
misleading in its wording of the procedure, due to the fact that the EP does not possess a 
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power to “elect” but rather a simple “power to confirm”. Despite the possibility for the 
Parliament to veto a non-desirable candidate, the level of influence never really goes 
beyond a positive appointment power. Finally, they theorize the launch of an electoral 
campaign from EPs with top candidates for the position of EC president as a way to pre-
empt the power of the European Council, but end their argument with a somewhat 
skeptical tone over the possibility of such an occurrence (Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011, 
173-174). Much to their disappointment, however, this is precisely what was going to 
happen only one year after the publication of their research. Thanks to EP Resolution 
22/11/2012, the EP: 
 
“(...) urges the European political parties to nominate candidates for the 
Presidency of the Commission and expects those candidates to play a leading 
role in the parliamentary electoral campaign, in particular by personally 
presenting their programme in all Member States of the Union; [it] stresses the 
importance of reinforcing the political legitimacy of both Parliament and the 
Commission by connecting their respective elections more directly to the choice 
of the voters. (...)” (EP Resolution 22/11/2012)  
 
Therefore, under the guidance of EP President Martin Schulz the Parliament (already 
reinforced by the recent Lisbon reform) sought to score an ambitious move for 
increasing the EP’s influence and try to promote a new important step in the Union’s 
democratization process. It should also be noted that some have attributed a special role 
in such initiative to the will of the very same Schulz. Following the need for a real 
charismatic figure in the EU institutional process that may influence change, partisans 
of the initiative have spoken elegies of the President of the Parliament (Weiler, 2013, 
749-750). Regardless, the press has also recognized certain diffidence born in the minds 
of national leaders towards the man who defied the status quo and interpreted the legal 
freedom of interpretation in the treaty to bolster the EP’s rights (Pauly and Schult, 2014; 
Tost, 2014). Be it as it may, the EC also seemed to reply positively to the proposal. In a 
recent EC communication over the EP Elections 2014, the Commission strongly 
defended the need for more democratic legitimacy and diplomatically admitted that “the 
outcome of the European elections should play a key role in determining which 
candidate becomes President of the Commission” (EC Communication, 2013, 6). What 
still remains questionable, however, is the rhetoric exploited by the EP in launching its 
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message towards the first candidates’ electoral campaign. A quick look to the slogan 
“this time is different” and the tone of its declarations (“The EU governments... [when 
selecting a candidate] must do so on the basis of election results”) could erroneously 
launch a certain message about new democratization automatically taking place in the 
Union (EP Press Release, 2014). Much to their dismay, both the deducible analysis 
from the reading of the TEU article above and the arguments noted by other academics 
would seem to dismount such theory. This is because the legal basis of the treaties never 
explicitly ensure that the selected candidate must be coming either from the most voted 
party in European elections or to have participated in the electoral contest at all 
(Bertoncini and Chopin, 2014, 3; Stratulat and Emmanouidilis, 2013, 6). It is true that 
the EP still has veto power against undesirable or outsider candidates thanks to the very 
same power of appointment previously discussed. In case of intergovernmental 
backdoor solutions it may well reject the proposed solution and demand respect for 
what was claimed during elections (Peglis, 2011, 223). But among endless EU 
negotiations in the quest for a suitable candidate and the threat of institutional deadlock 
in a European Council vs. EP struggle, there is no certainty in the outcome of the EP 
Elections 2014 - or the one from future electoral contests - over the maintenance of the 
promise given by the electoral race. More on the subject is going to be discussed in the 
following sub-sections (3.2 – 4.2). 
 
 
3.2 The academic debate on the politicization of the EC Presidency 
 
The proclamation of an electoral race for candidates to the EC Presidency has indeed 
inspired a great deal of academic literature on the politicization of the EC President 
through the direct affiliation with the EP in the election. Some have expressed a strong 
sense of rejection towards the idea. Bartolini, although still writing in a time in which 
the idea was being transferred from the failed constitutional treaty to the new Lisbon 
version, already stated that the EPs are not the ideal means for carrying out a 
politicization process. Furthermore, he saw the politicization of the EC presidency as a 
future disappointment driven by too many compromises, and made a claim for a further 
weakness in the argument due to the lack of a sufficient political debate in Europe to 
sustain such initiative (Bartolini in Řiháčková, 2006, 6-7). Somewhat ironically - and 
despite writing a small epistolary book against euroscepticism - Wagner and Fuertes are 
also markedly against the idea of the democratic intervention in the election of the 
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President of the Commission. They reckon the idea to be “unnecessary” because in the 
end what is really needed is not a charismatic face but a solid political programme of 
action. In the end, there is no need to introduce a candidates’ campaign variable in the 
process (Wagner and Fuertes; 2013, 84-85). Swedish journalist Ström Melin is even 
harsher in her eurosceptical tones. She forecasts the EP Elections 2014 to be a bitter 
disappointment because national political leaders will always have the final word in 
each case. She also worries a great deal about the whole idea of democratic legitimacy 
for the EC, almost as if it were comparable to a national government. Rejecting the 
whole project altogether, her final claim is to rather keep strengthening the Parliament, 
because that is where European democracy is better sustained on a national level (Ström 
Melin; 2013).  
 
However, the debate is not entirely polarized on negative opinions of the proposal. It 
also finds a great deal of support and praise among a good number of authors (Hix and 
Høyland, 2012; Louis, 2013; Stratulat and Emmanouilidis, 2013; Vitorino, 2014; 
Weiler, 2013; Wille, 2013). In their views, multiple benefits may well arise from the 
initiative. First of all, the electoral race of the candidates has the beneficial effect of 
reviving the interest in EU politics, in-so-far as it finally gives voters a real sense of 
political campaigning during the elections. If the project were to be successful, there 
could be fertile ground for creating a new culture of European voting: one where the 
visibility and strength of both the EP and the EPs would be greatly increased by the 
novelty (Louis, 2013, 13; Stratulat and Emmanouidilis, 2013, 4). Some have even 
pushed the statement further into theorizing that the electoral competition for the 
selection of top positions in the EU is the key to exit the second-order national elections 
dilemma of EU elections (Hix and Høyland, 2012, 154). Others have even celebrated 
the idea of the electoral race as the triumph of the primacy of politics over law, thanks 
to the possibilities opened by the EP resolution without even having to undergo new 
painful treaty revisions (Weiler; 2013, 750). Most importantly, the best outcome 
desirable would be the end of the EC as a technocratic, unknown and distant body of 
governance. The politicization of the Presidency would help make it much more 
politically accountable and transparent (Louis, 2013, 13; Stratulat and Emmanouidilis, 
2013, 4). As already suggested in other moments of this research, democratization 
necessarily implies politicization; thus for Wille the time has finally come to overcome 
the old Jean Monnet method of European integration, whose modus operandi was 
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strictly focused in avoiding on keeping any political game out of the EC (Wille; 2013, 
386). After all, as Louis originally put it, the EC President and the College of 
commissioners have never been “politically asexual”. They do have affiliation with 
political parties (be them national or European) which eventually tend to resonate in 
their programmes. In his view, some kind of politicization is already in place inside the 
EU institutions, and it is not necessarily a “bad thing” (Louis, 2013, 18-19). 
 
In any case, the specialized literature does not fail to also recognize a substantial set of 
risks and fallbacks that may affect the process. Weiler acknowledges that the whole 
process is a huge shift in the institutional culture of the Union, and that the final 
outcomes of politicization are “terra incognita”. Regardless, he would add that despite 
the risks the attempt is completely worth the effort (Weiler; 2013, 751). Stratulat and 
Emmanouidilis have been instead much more concrete in their expressions of concern, 
and provided some interesting points for reflection. The effects of the politicization of 
the EC Presidency may tend to weaken the EP’s labor of scrutiny of the Commission 
due to the favoritism applied to “their” candidate; vice versa, the newly established 
political links may jeopardize the historical role of the Commission as the guardian of 
the treaties. And even if the accuse of partisanism could be tamed, who is to prove that a 
politicized President of the European Commission is going to have that much influence 
in the Union's political line? Recalling the very same argument delivered by Ortega 
Gómez in Section 2.3, the EU counts at the moment with a quadruple presidential 
system plus one new high representant of foreign affairs. In order to respect the 
historical EU ideological balance – where politics is all about compromise and strategic 
positioning - it is very likely that a good part of the other influential positions will be 
distributed alongside different sections of the political spectrum. The final outcome may 
then end into an ideological blurrance that will neutralize any politicizing effect 
(Stratulat and Emmanouidilis, 2013, 6). A further structural risk is also offered by a 
recently created definition of much effect among academics and press, namely the issue 
of the candidates’ campaign reduced to a “political beauty contest”. If the 
Spitzenkandidaten to the place of EC President are not accompanied by strong political 
platforms and by a fundamentally solid political programme that clearly shows their 
future line of action, then the whole electoral race will end up being just an empty 
marketing campaign with very little transformational effects (Weiler, 2013, 750-752; 
Stratulat and Emmanouidilis, 2013, 5; Peglis, 2011, 223, 226-228).  
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On an endnote, while the whole conceptual field just analyzed will indeed help in the 
practical analysis of the EP Elections 2014 (Section 4.1), it should also be mentioned 
that another strand of the literature has sought a different way out of the present 
politicization dilemma. As already echoed in other parts of the debate, Decker and 
Sonnicksen have expressed their highly critical view of the EP and the elections as 
means to achieve politicization (Section 3.1). Their theory is instead based in the 
breaking of an unspoken “European taboo”, namely the presidentialization of the 
Commission through the holding of presidential elections for the place of EC President. 
They do so by discharging the Parliament from the appointment procedure (and 
comparing it to the current US elections system in place), yet leaving the EPs the 
opportunity to free themselves from long-term majority in favor of ad-hoc coalitions for 
each legislative proposal to be voted. In such a way, the authors generate an opportunity 
to the EU for having a real “President of the EU” through popular democratic elections. 
The institutional position would acquire a huge degree of political accountability, 
greater representation on the international scene (both in Europe and overseas) and due 
to its renewed importance it would finally give the right europeanizing push to EU-level 
elections (Decker, 2012; Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011 but also Kassim et al., 2013, 
176). While intellectually stimulating for supporters of European integration, a whole 
set of limitations may constrain the potential of this proposal as to leave it indefinitely 
in the theoretical field. Kassim et al. remind that the Commission is based first and 
foremost upon the decisions of the whole college of commissioners, and warn in details 
about the costs of an excessive centralization of powers in the hands of the President 
(Kassim et al., 2013, 177). If Wagner and Fuertes were already against the current 
electoral race put in place by the EP, their words are of outmost dismissal by claiming 
the solution as both inadmissible and improper. To their words, the EU is not fit nor 
intended to possess a presidential regime (Wagner and Fuertes, 2013, 84). In the end, 
the very same promoters would tend to admit the unfortunate causes that prevent the 
application of the system. They mostly include the widely spread conception of 
Presidentialism in Europe as something “unknown” - or just too American - and the 
unsustainable pressure that the measure would bring upon the EU consensual structure 
and the powers of the European Council. (Decker and Sonnicksen, 2013, 181-191).   
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4. EP Elections 2014: Still “Business as usual”? 
 
4.1 The 2014’s “Spitzenkandidaten”: a political beauty contest?  
 
This section seeks to cast an accurate look over the turn of the events during the 8
th
 
European elections held on the 22
nd
-25
th
 of May 2014. In order to do so, the initial sub-
section will provide a description of the candidates that finally emerged in the campaign 
preceding the vote. This, in turn, will allow a preliminary conclusion on whether 
academic fears of a weak political campaign mentioned in Section 3.2 actually had 
some truth in their concern. The initial list of candidates is extracted from the useful 
works of analysis of Aixalà (2014, 4-17) and Pedrafita and Renman (2014, 5-6). By 
listing them through their EPs affiliation, therefore, the selection includes the following:  
 
- The European Left (EL, but also GUE/NGL) coalition, while initially regarding the 
candidate’s proposal somewhat suspiciously, experienced a shift of attitude towards 
exploiting the potential of the “personalization” of EU politics. They selected Alexis 
Tsipras (leader of the Greek main opposition party Syriza) and went for a campaign 
for a more democratic and socially responsible EU  
- The European Green Party (EGP) sought instead to bring a whole new additional 
level of democratization in the proposal. By using an open online voting campaign 
on their website and respecting the long-term tradition of co-management and equity 
inside the Europarty, they ended up electing both Ska Keller and José Bové to co-
run for the same place. As easily deducible, some perceived the idea as confusing or 
at least not beneficial to the principle of the EP’s electoral race 
- A traditional and very conservative approach was instead exploited by the Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), which without even reaching a vote, 
ended up negotiating the historical leader of the ALDE group Guy Verhofstadt as 
spitzenkandidate. The result was achieved by promising the rival Olli Rehn another 
influential post inside the EU executive, but the whole process sounded more like an 
example of realpolitiks in contrast with the democratizing tone of the electoral race.  
- The Party of European Socialists (PES) was unquestionably the most prepared to 
dominate the electoral race. Their strategy for a candidate was already planned 
during 2011 and the ties between Martin Schulz and the EP resolution have already 
been discussed elsewhere in the research (Section 3.1). However, it should be noted 
that Schulz’s selection came from a process with no other rival for the position and 
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only after a long series of debates with various factions of the party (like the British 
Labor) who were skeptical of the “ultra-federalist” EP President.  
- Finally, the biggest share of interest was focused around the choice of the European 
People’s Party (EPP). Being the traditional majority party in the EP and filling with 
their representatives a good part of the European institutions, their presence in the 
campaign was always seen as fundamental in order to legitimize the whole 
campaign. Their nomination was the last one to enter the process and it came only 
after a long debate among three candidates. Only in march 2014 the range of 
internal voting finally delivered the spitzenkandidate, and the choice went for 
former Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker
2
.  
 
Trying to determine the outcome of the political campaign may appear as a difficult 
task. This is probably likely when considering that it is the first time in the history of 
European integration that a political debate involving clear candidates has tried to inject 
a new europeanizing potential into elections. Regardless, some preliminary elements 
may guide into thinking that those very same concerns for a “political beauty contest” 
actually held some truth into them. Piedrafita and Renman have been elaborating an 
influential list of obstacles that may affect the candidates’ campaigning. Aside from the 
strong language barriers still present in the European continent, they warned about the 
inefficient budgets that EPs were going to deploy for a campaign whose scope was 
going to be much larger. Perhaps most importantly, they acknowledged the huge 
structural deficits of the EPs’ manifestos. Most of them tended to be more or less 
specific, hugely focused on ideologies and big statements of intentions, but much less 
practical on their actual planned proposals and sometimes even involving themselves in 
policy areas not even entrusted to the EP. Even worse, the traditionally big EPs (EPP, 
PES and ALDE) were accused of certain “homogeneity” in their proposals, one that 
would strongly weaken the message of the campaign (Pedrafita and Renman, 2014, 7-
8). Such claims also seem to be reinforced by the outcome of the first televised debates 
among the candidates, a further initiative inspired by an American presidential-style 
                                                          
2
 Awareness should also be risen about the fact that other EPs (the most notorious of which being the 
European Conservatives and Reformists, ERC) eventually rejected the proposal altogether. ERC went for 
a strong declaratory no to the initiative by defining it a “1950-style vision” by claiming to speak “for the 
large majority of Europeans  who have never consented to be citizens of a federal union” (Euractiv, 
2014a)  
24 
 
effort to raise EU citizens’ awareness. In many cases, media coverage acknowledged a 
lack of winners of the debates precisely due to the lack of political extremes (Euractiv, 
2014c; Vincenti, D. and Cerulus, L. 2014.)
3
. In any case, the ambiguous results of the 
EP Elections 2014 mainly complicated the outcome of the candidates’ race even further.  
 
 
4.2 EP Elections results and present negotiations struggle 
 
Although history may well end up remembering this last EP Elections as the first ones 
in a new attempted framework of democratization and politicization, it is also likely that 
many will hold them as the true raise of Euroscepticism. The statement seems to be 
sustained by a look at the numbers on the EP website which show how - contrary to the 
majority of expectations - the ECR group has arrived to claim the third position in 
number of MEPs and elevated their total number of members from 57 to 68 (1 MEP 
over ALDE). The same applies to the European Freedom and Democracy group (EFD), 
which raises their total numbers from 31 in 2009 to 48 in 2014. While it is indeed true 
that they still do not hold a worrying majority in the EP, an essential consideration must 
be gathered from the results of the elections: namely, that due to the new 2014’s 
distribution of seats (whose total number was also reduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions) the position of the historically big parties has effectively weakened. The 
reality looks even harsher when considering the decrease of the EPP’s total numbers 
(from 274 in 2009 to 221) and ALDE’s (from 83 in 2009 to 67). The PSE’s losses look 
lighter (196 in 2009 to 191), but still relevant to the decreasing context (EP Website; 
2014). Recalling the necessary majority that must be achieved in order to pass the EP 
approval to be EC President (at least 376 votes out of 751), this inaugurates a necessary 
game of big coalitions for the final stability and decision of an agreed candidate.  
 
It is precisely here where the big dilemma over the functionality of the whole 
politicizing proposal reveals itself. On one side, the EP (whose ideal task would be to 
obtain an EPP-PSE-ALDE coalition with EPP-winning Juncker as common candidate) 
and Germany (under the strong leadership of Angela Merkel) try to ensure as much as 
                                                          
3
 The reader should know, however, that statistically most of the Union’s public broadcasters did not even 
plan to show the debate on their channels. The initiative still reached only a limited part of the EU 
population, probably representing individuals actually interested in EU politics (Vincenti. and Cerulus, 
2014) 
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possible that the final outcome will be one respecting the promises of the electoral 
campaign (BBC News Europe, 2014; Tost, 2014). But on the other, a new 
intergovernmental debate emerged on the European scene to complicate negotiations 
even further. Under the raging voice of a traditionally conservative UK, a group of MS 
set forward new claims of a certain political weight against the whole EC President’s 
election process. Furthermore, official sources quoted UK officials as naming the 
process an “idiotic procedure” and the very same Prime Minister David Cameron wrote 
that “Juncker wasn’t in the ballot papers” and that the very same idea of the 
politicization of the EC is an appalling inconvenience to be avoided at all costs. 
Ultimately, Great Britain even threatened to abandon the Union in the case of a “wrong 
choice” not coming from the will of the European Council (Euractiv, 2014b; Pauly and 
Schult, 2014). However, as the press has commented, the most likely explanation for 
such rebellious attitude may just be a typical strategy of fake outrage in order to acquire 
concessions and fallbacks from previously agreed European measures. For example, the 
fact that Juncker may be willing to re-discuss the terms of free circulation for people 
inside the Union in order to please Cameron may represent a solid but hollow point 
(Euractiv, 2014b; Gallego, 2014). Be it as it may, the scenery may be even more 
discouraging when hearing the words of European Council President Von Rompuy. 
Perhaps out of faithfulness to the very same MS he represents, his declarations saw him 
completely against the idea of having a democratically elected President of the 
European Council, but also quite unfavorable to the current democratizing effort 
towards the EC Presidency (Gotev, 2012). Finally, there are also those that suggest a 
third way out of the political impasse. Influential analyst José Ignacio Torreblanca has 
strongly theorized a situation in which Juncker will not be able to negotiate his way out 
of the intergovernmental labyrinth, making it likely that the European Council will have 
to find a fitting “first-class” substitute. If they were to find an attractive alternative, most 
likely EPP-affiliated so as to still give respect to the treaty (but not to the EP 
Resolution), then sufficient consensus could be gathered as to unlock the threatening 
institutional deadlock. (Gotev, 2014). While being another possible example of 
successful EU compromise situation, it appears quite obvious that the biggest loser in 
such an occurrence would be the EP, stricken at the heart of its credibility and losing a 
huge share of its legitimatory power over other EU institutions. The next EP Elections 
may even turn into a joke (Torreblanca, 2014).  
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Could there be a real opportunity for such legitimacy-threatening solution? At the time 
of writing, the question is still open for debate. However, while it is impossible to 
foresee the future, it is instead feasible to try and add into the account the reference of 
certain academics focusing on the selection criteria for the EC Presidency. Negrescu 
(2012) sought to construct in his work the profile of the ideal President of the 
Commission. He eventually declared that the selection of the candidate derives from the 
personal qualities of the individual, but most importantly from the socio-economical 
conditions and the state of the political evolution of European integration at the moment 
of choosing. Tömmel (2013) also arrived to very same conclusions in applying the 
theory of transactional vs. transforming leaders to the European context, thus 
determining that the achievement of an efficient EC President derives both from its 
personal qualities and the situational context of the Union. Bertoncini and Chopin 
(2014) have listed all the criterions that will have to be considered for the 2014 election 
of the Commission’s Presidency: (a). the possible candidate’s Europarty affiliation; (b). 
the personal profile of the candidate; (c). the candidate’s country of origin; (d). finally, 
the “Rubik’s cube” framework in which the selection of a candidate does not only 
depend on the status of the Commission but also on other EU and International posts, 
therefore seeking ideological and nationality balance in the picking of candidates. 
Following the introduction of such variables, the possibilities for an outsider candidate 
could be even greater, and so would be the risk for the political and legitimatory future 
of the EP.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The debate around the democratization and politicization of the EC Commission 
Presidency is certainly one dense with a large number of factors that may either increase 
or constrain the potential of the new proposal established during the EP Elections 2014. 
The democratizing opportunity is one that, despite all controversial opinions, could 
advance the debate on the democratic deficit of the Union (Section 2.1). It could also 
help to advance the structural problems of the EP’s role in the EU system and the 
evolution of the present second-order national elections into a new European culture of 
voting (Section 2.2). However, the process will have to deal with the renewed role of 
the 21
st
 century’s EC, one with less authority over the European integration process and 
an EC President who risks being blurred by a system with many EU top positions and 
no clear authoritative “Presidency of the EU” (Section 2.3). Clearly, the legal 
ambiguities expressed by the Lisbon Treaty and an EP resolution without real binding 
effects do not help to set a clear framework for the outcome of the proposal (Section 
3.1). They do, however, invite multiple speculations over the rejection or the approval 
of the idea, alongside the analysis of multiple risks that may weaken the project (Section 
3.2). It is very much likely that one in particular already proved to be true, namely the 
celebration of a “political beauty contest” representing a weak political campaign of the 
EC Presidency’s candidates (Section 4.1) that eventually left the door open for new 
interpretations of the treaty provisions and the quest for an intergovernmental escape 
from the EP’s Spitzenkandidaten promise (Section 4.2). Is therefore the 2014’s attempt 
of politicization (and democratization) of the EC Presidency a step forward in the 
Union’s legitimization process? The answer should be a rather combined approach of 
Yes and No. If the context analyzed is the EU in 2014, where: (a). the President of the 
EC is strongly embedded in a plural system with multiples checks and balances and 
cannot steer the political direction of the Union; (b). treaty provisions are ambiguous 
and the EP resolutions not binding, hence giving a very much likely chance for 
backdoor intergovernmental solutions; (c). the EP still has to walk a long journey ahead 
in order to truly unlock a real potential as the Parliament of the European Union; then 
the answer to our question must be negative. This would be true even if in the end the 
negotiations towards the acceptance of Jean-Claude Juncker proved to be successful. 
Indeed, the structural limitations imposed over the role of the President of the EC and 
the very same fact that the democratizing argument had to pass a survival threat of 
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intergovernmental nature would tell much over the risks at stake for the process. They 
would prove that the European Union has not yet achieved a substantial progress in its 
walk towards being a fully legitimized institution. But, by quoting José Ignacio 
Torreblanca, if the events happening in the EP Elections 2014 were to be considered as 
the start of a new age for EU politics, then the answer would need to be different. If this 
were to be a new long-term process in which citizens, governments and institutions 
question for the first time who should rule the Union and how, then this could be the 
first real step forward towards a renewed EU’s legitimization process. After almost 
seventy years of European integration, the time has arrived for everyone in Europe to 
answer a new fundamental question over European democracy: “who holds more 
legitimacy in the Union when it comes to electing the President of the Commission? 28 
state-rulers democratically elected in national processes or 751 MEPs directly elected 
by over 200 millions Europeans?” (Torreblanca, 2014).  
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